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Carlos Real de Azúa* 
In 1975 CEPAL submitted a request to a 
distinguished Uruguayan intellectual, Car-
los Real de Azüa, for a study on the 
special economic and political develop-
ment problems that small nations have to 
face. The author prepared a first draft in 
that same year, but, for various reasons, 
never completed the final version. Now, 
when all who knew him are lamenting his 
untimely death, we wish to pay him the 
modest tribute of publishing part of his 
study in the form of an article. 
He begins by outlining the general 
characteristics of the 'national size' phe-
nomenon and exploring what has been 
said on the subject by some of the classi-
cal writers -such as Aristóteles, Plato, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau-, and then 
goes on to present the criteria in the light 
of which, in his opinion, the economic 
and political significance of national size 
can be evaluated. On this theoretical 
basis, he examines in detail the way in 
which the small size of a nation can affect 
certain economic and political conditions 
of development, including, inter alia, the 
available supply of natural and human 
resources, the size of the market, indus-
trialization, external vulnerability, capac-
ity for internal political control and social 
cohesion and homogeneity. In the last 
section, he analyses the possibilities of 
applying, in the case of small nations, 
what he has called the 'constrictive' style 
of development. 
•Consultant, CEPAL, Social Development 
Division. 
1. The subject of national size 
A nation, or more accurately a nation-
State, is the ordinary scene of operation 
for a style of development, and this 
specification has serious and substantial 
implications. As a collection of miscella-
neous resources, as an area of conceiv-
able viability, the nation-State scenario 
may be one of the most commonsensical 
determinants of the choice of a style; 
nevertheless, it would not be far wrong 
to infer that the selection of styles is 
decided by other motives and that the 
weighing-up of viability, conditions and 
resources is a task of estimation carried 
out 'a posteriori', with all the contingent 
adjustments and amendments that it 
may entail. 
Be this as it may, nation-States and 
styles of development are two phenome-
na which up to now have been generated 
in completely diachronic fashion; the 
former came first and the latter very 
much later, although the gap between 
them may seem narrow in the case of the 
'new nations'. Even today, however, 
Cobban's remark holds good: when a 
nation is seeking self-determination it 
does not do so on the basis of a balance-
sheet of positive and negative qualifica-
tions.1 At one stage of history or 
another, then, the national entity ap-
pears as the primary and inexorable de-
terminant of the bounds within which 
any system of growth or development 
activities must operate. The practical 
consensus existing on this point obviates 
the need to dwell on it further.2 Self-
'See Alfred Cobban, The Nation-State and 
National Self-De terminations, New York, 
Thomas and Crowell Co., 1970, p. 137. 
2Cf. Helio Jaguaribe, "Los modelos polí-
ticos y el desarrollo nacional en América Lati-
na", in Aportes, N° 6, Paris, October 1967, pp. 
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sufficient and independent, or hopelessly 
needy and dependent, the nation-State 
as a concrete reality counts for a great 
deal, and it is not a matter of indif-
ference that in the second of these 
alternative cases - tha t of indigence-
even the most cogent external impera-
tives have to go through a process of 
authentication via a system of adoption of 
formally 'final' decisions, supposed to be 
implemented unilaterally within a given 
milieu. 
Today, in reality, the nation-State, 
or the nation pure and simple, appears, 
in contrast to all the premonitions of its 
decadence —and also to all the emphasis 
placed on its invincible might— as a form 
of human and spatial organization whose 
characteristics can be defined by a series 
of highly contradictory epithets: in-
creasing in terms of number (about 50 
new nations in the last few decades); 
tremendously durable and steadfast to 
withstand all potential aggressions on the 
part of powers in the ascendant; ines-
capable or indispensable in all kinds of 
promotion activities, although at the 
same time frail and insecure; conditioned 
by history; inadequate and inappropriate 
for a large number of functions and 
requirements;3 and perhaps destined, in 
8-9; Marshall Wolfe, "Development: images, 
conceptions, criteria, agents, choices", in 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. 
XVIII, N06. 1-2, 1973, p. 5; Marshall Wolfe, 
Report on a unified approach to development 
analysis and planning (Preliminary report of the 
Secretary-General) (E/CN.5/477), document 
presented at the twenty-third session of the 
Commission for Social Development, October 
1973, p. 8; Marshall Wolfe, "Approaches to 
development: who is approaching what? ", in 
CEPAL Review, N° 1 (First half of 1976), 
United Nations publication, Sales N°: 
E.76.II.G.2, p. 142. 
3It would have been hard to imagine, for 
example,, in the years when William T. Fox was 
the remote future, to give way to 
broader or more ambitious patterns of 
human and spatial organization.4 
But for practical purposes it would 
be unrealistic, or, above all, dangerous, 
to discount any nation as an absolute 
rather than as a relative concept: a na-
tion, as someone has noted, may be 
integrated as solidly as a private firm or 
so loosely that it is pointless (or, more 
exactly, almost pointless) to treat it as 
such.5 In any event, we believe it may 
usefully be examined 'as such' in one of 
its facets - tha t of size- in relation to 
development and development styles, 
leaving for another possible occasion the 
much-canvassed topic of patterns of 
amalgamation or integration which will 
wipe out or offset its shortcomings. 
Among all the problems posed by 
the national entity with respect to devel-
opment programming and styles, that of 
size will be the sole —but very complex-
question to be tackled here. And assum-
ing that large national areas and popula-
tions do not constitute any obstacle to 
promotion policies, only one of the ex-
treme dimensional possibilities -small-
ness of size— will be discussed. 
theorizing about 'superpowers' and Carl 
Schmitt about international hierarchization 
(1939, 1944), that a third of a century later one 
of these powers was going to stand in such 
urgent need of the other's natural gas, and the 
latter of the former's intermediate technology. 
4
 With regard to these characteristics, see 
especially Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and 
Social Communication, The M.I.T. Press, 1966, 
pp. 3 et seq. 
5
 See I. Svennilson, "The concept of the 
nation and its relevance to economic analysis", 
in The Economic Consequences of the Size of 
Nations, Proceedings of a Conference held by 
the International Economic Association (ed. 
E.A.G. Robinson), London, MacMillan and Co. 
Ltd., 1960, p. 2. 
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Perhaps it is because "never before 
have national units so numerous and 
exhibiting such wide variations in size. . . 
participated as juridical equals. . . in a 
common world order"6 that the attention 
attracted by the problem of national size 
has been less sporadic and impres-
sionistic than that reflected in the histo-
ry of ideas on the subject which will be 
briefly recapitulated below. 'Sheer size', 
says Apter, "is an obvious organizational 
factor that is often neglected".7 But in 
considering the 'national measurements' 
which the size factor involves, the time 
factor cannot be left out of account: 
each period of history implies its own, 
and whereas in the nineteenth century 
they mattered almost exclusively in rela-
tion to financial resources, military 
defence and political structures, today 
they are of importance first and fore-
most in terms of industrialization possi-
bilities and market size.8 The question 
of the 'optimum national scale' is posed, 
in any event, with reference to the maxi-
mum returns on the potential of a given 
space and the fullest satisfaction of its 
inhabitants' needs; and it is this duality 
of applicable criteria that opens up the 
possibilities of appraising what size can 
6
 Marshall Wolfe, Report on a unified ap-
proach, op.cit, p. 6. Leslie Lipson wonders 
what is the most desirable and practicable size 
for a unit of government. Can a State be too 
small or too large to operate effectively? What 
is the allegiance that inspires in people within 
the same political limits a feeling of loyalty and 
community spirit? See Leslie Lipson, Los gran-
des problemas de la política, Mexico City, 
Limusa-Wiley, 1964, p. 343. 
7
 See D. Apter and H. Eckstein (ed.), Com-
parative Politics, The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1964, p. 647. 
8
 See Dankart A. Rustow, A World of 
Nations, Washington D.C., The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1971, p. 247. 
achieve at two different levels and even 
classifying those achievements under the 
broader and not necessarily coincident 
heads of efficiency and legitimacy.9 
2. A glance at history 
There is really nothing systematic about 
the adoption of the two points of view 
in the rather meagre history of the sub-
ject of community size. We use the 
generic term 'community' because in 
that history two stages have to be distin-
guished: the prenational and the nation-
al, with the peculiarity that many 
arguments and justifications conceived in 
the first were reiterated and applied in 
the second. 
Plato, Aristóteles, Rousseau stated 
the problem primarily in terms of cohe-
sion, consensus and possibilities of self-
government; in the writings of Aristó-
teles, however, almost all the arguments 
that held sway during that phase were 
articulated in synthesis.10 Thus, aware-
ness of the political facilities represented 
by the strict confines of the 'polis' (or 
the circumscription of the canton, in 
Rousseau) was accompanied by percep-
tion of the amount of resources that the 
area should contain if it were to achieve 
the much-desired 'autarky'; and insight 
was also gained into the domain of'pub-
lic order'. It was realized that interrela-
tionships existed between territorial 
measurements and the possibilities of 
more methodical control over the popu-
lation. And if capacity for control is one 
9
 Lipson, op. cit., p. 104, remarks that asso-
ciations of human beings based on government 
and defence requirements and those deriving 
from links of affinity and cohesion, attributable 
as they are to two different motivations, do not 
necessarily coincide. 
10
 See Politics, book VII, Chapter IV. 
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of the hallmarks of any sound organiza-
tion, it must be added that Aristóteles 
conceived the possibility of the national 
model as a type of spatial organization in 
cases where dimensions exceeded those 
thought to be fitting and reasonable for 
the traditional 'city of antiquity'.11 
The greatest city-State is not the 
largest or the most populous, said Aristó-
teles. This assertion, together with 
others, draws attention to the Stagirite's 
ability to arrive at the concept of mag-
nitude or entity as distinct from mere 
physical 'size': the criteria whereby the 
one was differentiated from the other 
were the qualities of the inhabitants in 
terms of worth, intelligence and willing-
ness to work hard, their level of integra-
tion or -as Aristóteles puts i t - the 
efficiency with which they perform the 
tasks incumbent on them.12 
When, two thousand years later, 
these conclusions were restated, it was 
from the primarily political angle of 
'dimension' and 'regime' that they were 
considered. The possibility of a republic 
was assigned by Montesquieu to small 
communities, whereas he believed that 
those of medium size were more compat-
ible with monarchy and very large ones 
with despotism. Rousseau, with regard 
to population size, maintained that the 
number of ruling figures decreases in 
proportion to the increase in the popula-
tion, a ratio which as a proposition is 
perfectly correct provided it is assumed 
(we do not know of any analyses of the 
postulate) that there are fixed degrees of 




 Ibid. It is also worth while to point out 
that he noted the possibility of achievements 
which could offset disadvantages, in his remark 
that "the largest city is not the happiest". Cf. 
similar considerations elsewhere in his work. 
from the point of view of Rousseau) and 
a given number of decision-makers which 
remains the same, irrespective of the size 
of the territory in which these decisions 
have to be implemented.13 
With the passage of half a century 
the predominant markedly universalist 
illuminism and belief in natural law gave 
ground, and the topic of national size and 
of the advantages and drawbacks of small 
dimensions surged up again concurrently 
with the wave of nationalist movements 
in the early and mid-nineteenth century. 
Almost always, however, the balance-
sheet of advantages and disadvantages 
was presented without reference to any 
specific time or place, a characteristic 
which was not avoided in a notably acute 
passage in Tocqueville's work'4 and 
only partly in the somewhat ambiguous 
attitude to small nations adopted by the 
founders of marxism.15 Generally 
speaking, when the balance worked out 
in favour of limited national dimensions, 
13
 ¿'Esprit des his, book VIII; Du contrat 
social, book III, chapter II. 
14
 Alexis de Tocqueville, La Democratic en 
A mérique (English edition, Phillips Bradley, 
New York, 1945), vol. II. 
15
 Very well set forth in Marx-Engels, Ma-
teriales para la historia de América Latina, 
Buenos Aires, Pasado y Presente, 1972, intro-
duction by Pedro Scarón, pp. 8-11. Interesting 
comments are also to be found in Edward 
Hallet-Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 
1917-1923, Penguin Books, 1966. Predominant 
among the many and sometimes contradictory 
views expressed by Marx and Engels on national 
size is their admiration for large national units 
endowed with genuine potentialities in respect 
of development, market size, consistency, 
'large-scale social production*, etc., and their 
general contempt for small nations, which leads 
one to suppose that however heatedly they 
defended the cause of some that were labouring 
under the yoke of colonialism, they did so 
more from 'anticolonialism'than for any other 
reason. 
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there was -and still has been in our own 
time16 - a tendency to extrapolate un-
blushingly in its support the undeniable 
qualities of Athens or Florence or 
Weimar, i.e., of small prenational cen-
tres, socially and culturally aristocratic, 
whose history had unfolded when the 
world was in the pre development stage 
and which were embedded in cultural 
areas whose continuity and kinship were 
substantial. With this kind of special 
pleading and a little imagination the case 
is easy to defend, at least for a not 
over-strict judgement.17 
Much more insidious than these argu-
ments on behalf of minimum or maxi-
mum size is the solid system of assump-
tions and associations on which their 
inspiration and even their strength of 
conviction is based. This body of suppo-
sitions - o r so at least we think- is more 
than capable of effectively battering at 
any critical reflection on the national size 
claimed to be appropriate: a capacity that 
is enhanced by the shortage, the complex-
ity, the non-com par ability and the scant 
quantifiability of the empirical material 
accessible to a type of thinking which 
aims at following other paths. 
To put it more plainly, a smaller 
space and a smaller population are asso-
16
 A case in point is afforded by Mariano 
Picón Salas, "Las pequeñas naciones" (address 
delivered at the University of Puerto Rico), in 
Europa-América, Mexico City, Cuadernos Ame-
ricanos, 1947, pp. 199-225. 
17
 It has been contended, for example, 
with respect to Athens, Florence and other 
centres in Italy and elsewhere, that small nations 
afford a life of more interest and intensity. 
This is obviously true enough, in the case of 
cities professing a great love of peace and of the 
universal values: a matter in which they have 
not much choice, if they are not capable of 
externally powerful ventures which represent 
possibilities of self-projection at the world level 
rather than, as might be alleged, a great deal of 
imitation and some degree of alienation, etc. 
crated (in the imagination, by intuition) 
with certain characteristics and certain 
qualities; and, correlatively, following 
upon the great European processes of 
national unification in the last century 
and their special reverberations and 
analogies in some of the American 
nations (the United States, Argentina), 
the exact replica of these positions came 
to exist in the shape of a sort of quasi-
religious faith in the excellencies of 
maximum community dimensions: to 
add space to space and people to more 
people seemed the infallible method of 
increasing -with no possible room for a 
decline— power and wealth, liberty, hap-
piness, culture.18 
Although occasionally the space 
variable and the population variable join 
forces, it is essentially with larger or 
smaller areas of space that the following 
associations are built up: greater or lesser 
availabilities of material resources, of 
investment opportunities, of incentives 
to attract foreign interest and participa-
tion; diversification of production; 
difficulty of exerting social control, and, 
in particular, of preventing cases of 
social or local autonomy; existence of 
blockages in the channels of informa-
tion; capacity for defence and even 
invulnerability against military, political 
or economic aggression from outside the 
area; seriousness of interregional ten-
sions; capacity for retention of the popu-
lation; a closed economy and difficulties 
in opening it up to the outside world. 
In turn, it is principally with popula-
tion size that greater or lesser social 
diversification and integration are 
18This suggestion, deriving largely from 
the recently-achieved German 'Zollverein', is 
plain to be seen in the Río de la Plata contro-
versy of the 1860s respecting the 'patria grande' 
and the 'patria chica', and particularly in the 
allegations of Juan Carlos Gómez. 
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associated, as well as dissension, uncon-
trollability and possibilities of disinte-
gration; aptitude for proportional distri-
bution of social costs; collective security 
and pride; volume of consumer demand; 
rigidity, inflexibility and difficulties in 
adapting to unexpected contingencies.19 
Although nothing of the sort could 
be done here and now, each of these 
associations, after being checked and 
exemplified in many available statements 
of opinion, would be worth analysing in 
the light of the empirical evidence, 
through research on its socio-cultural, 
traditional, philosophical, and sometimes 
even religious origins. 
3. Possible appraisal criteria 
Thus there are diverse theoretical stand-
points from which smallness of national 
size can be appraised. And, without 
aiming at an exhaustive classification, 
they may be presumed, until more 
accurate categories can be established, to 
be the following: 
(a) Criterion of radical irrelevance. Size 
is not a decisive or even an important 
variable, nor is it disadvantageous to be a 
small nation, or of certain benefit to be a 
large one; 
(b) Criterion of absolute advantages and 
disadvantages of size, the verdict being 
almost invariably in favour of large units 
(the 'great States' of the nineteenth 
century); 
(c) Criterion of the proportionality of 
variables in relation to each size, and 
analysis of the nations "constructed on a 
small scale" to which allusion will be 
made later on; 
(d) Criterion of compensatory advan-
19
 For some of these associations see 
Tocqueville, loc. cit. 
tages and disadvantages or 'classic ap-
proach', usually focused in the case of 
small nations on their spatial dimension 
or on the antithesis between the 'qualita-
tive' (favourable to small size) and the 
'quantitative' (favourable to large size); 
(e) Criterion of comparison between 
advantages and disadvantages bred of 
size, but only in relation to units in the 
same geographical areas and/or at the 
same levels of development;20 
(f) Criterion of the community as an 
entity based on an aggregation of 
weighted variables (territory, population, 
economic structure and potential, educa-
tion, consumption, etc.);21 
(g) Criterion of the futility of an imma-
nentist and isolationist approach which 
disregards the continuities and discon-
tinuities -abrupt or graduated- bor-
dering upon the national frontiers,22 and 
does not concern itself with the possible 
application of regional amalgamation and 
integration policies, such as are feasible 
and common at the world level;23 
(h) Criterion which combines with any 
of the foregoing -from (b) to ( f ) - the 
20
 Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth of 
Small Nations", in Robinson, The Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations, op. cit., 
p. 16. 
21
 Cf. Helio Jaguaribe, Desarrollo econó-
mico y desarrollo político, Buenos Aires, Edito-
rial Eudeba, 1962, pp. 55-56. A significant 
effort in this direction, in our view, is Kart W. 
Deutsch's idea of 'national profiles', although a 
single indicator is not reached (see The Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 3-1960, vol. LIV, 
N° 1), in Roy C. Machdis and Bernard E.Brown 
(ed.), Comparative Politics, Illinois, The Dorsey 
Press, 1964, pp. 108-112. 
22
 Svennilson, op. cit., pp. 9-13. 
2 3
 See the distinction made by Helio 
Jaguaribe between 'individual viability' and 
'collective viability', in Desarrollo económico, 
op. cit., pp. 54-56; and 'Los modelos políticos 
y el desarrollo nacional ', op. cit., p. 89-90. 
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consideration of possible variables with 
strongly disjunctive values, that are 
capable of completely altering the course 
and ultimate destiny of a small nation. 
In following up the foregoing ap-
proach, several of these criteria can be 
dismissed at the outset. This is the case, 
in our opinion, with the criterion of 
'radical irrelevance', because of its facile 
scepticism and the fact that it clashes 
with a great deal of evidence; with that 
of 'absolute advantages and disadvan-
tages', because of its similarly facile dog-
matism, and likewise because it can 
manifestly be refuted by the testimony 
of history; with that of'proportionality', 
on the grounds that there are decisive 
elements in the nation-State pattern 
which preclude major reductions of 
scale; with that of'compensatory advan-
tages and disadvantages' whose appraisal 
is unrelated to any real place or specific 
period, because of its 'angelism' and the 
ineradicable impressionism that underlies 
it; with that of the 'national entity' 
based on a number of weighted variables, 
because of its extreme —and perhaps 
insuperable- complexity; and with that 
of the 'futility of the approach' which 
does not simultaneously take into 
account the integration possibilities of 
each national area on the grounds that in 
the first place, such integration pro-
grammes are not always feasible over the 
short term, and, secondly, they are not 
always immediately and obviously fa-
vourable to their members. But far 
greater significance attaches to the evi-
dence that the quality and destiny of 
such integration movements depend to a 
substantial extent on the conditions and 
characteristics of some of the parties to 
them, which can and indeed must be —at 
the least— analysed in general terms as a 
preliminary to any integration pro-
cess.24 (At all events, some of the conti-
nuities and discontinuities and, in par-
ticular, those generated by the forces 
operating at supra-, infra-, or extra-State 
levels, such as big producer corporations, 
ideologico-political, social, religious, and 
other power houses, etc., cannot be 
by-passed by any approach which aims at 
a minimum of realism.) A few words may 
be added on the criterion of the'variables 
with strongly disjunctive values' and 
their possible incidence. The examples 
adduced by a writer who has stressed 
their importance25 are of distinctly 
unequal weight. The problem of inten-
sive population pressure (El Salvador is 
usually cited as affected by this) does 
not seem to be of overriding significance. 
The existence of products in great 
demand, in particular those of the energy 
sector, does tend - t h e verdict is a 
commonplace- to have important impli-
cations,26 which also means that any 
study of the small Latin American 
nations would have to tone down its 
conclusions in the case of Ecuador. The 
third special feature involved, according 
to Kuznets, in the economic and social 
development processes of Scandinavia, 
Switzerland, Australia and Canada trans-
fers the problem -despite the pains 
taken with the supporting arguments-
to unrealistic levels. It was because of 
their position in one of the segments 
24
 See Institute of Latin American Studies, 
Development Problems in Latin America (an 
analysis by the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America), Austin and 
London, University of Texas Press, 1970, 
p. 141. 
25
 Simon Kuznets, op. cit., pp. 27-31. 
26
 With respect to the consequences of the 
discovery of petroleum, see Latin American 
Development and the International Economic 
Situation. Second Regional Appraisal of the 
international Development Strategy (E/ 
CEPAL/981), Vol. I, pp. 14-15. 
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into which the world was split by that 
dualization which between 1700 and 
1900 demarcated areas of development 
and underdevelopment, centre and 
periphery, independence and interdepen-
dence, that the countries mentioned 
were able to overcome certain disadvan-
tages of their small population and in the 
case of the first two —certainly not in 
that of the second pair! - 2 7 their 
limited national areas. 
Accordingly, one criterion is left to 
be applied: that implying a comparative 
study of advantages and disadvantages as 
between nations in the same geograph-
ical area and/or at the same economic 
level. 
In point of fact, attempts have 
already been made to formulate defini-
tions of the category comprising 'very 
small underdeveloped countries',28 con-
ceptualizations of the 'conspicuously 
underdeveloped small Latin American 
nation' type,2 9 and more or less impres-
sionistic situational approaches relating 
to the whole group of nations with small 
27
 The reason for including such countries 
is to be found in the population ceiling of 20 
million fixed by Simon Kuznets for medium-
sized nations. 
28
 See Helio Jaguaribe, Desarrollo econó-
mico, op. cit, pp. 54-56; and Los modelos 
políticos, op. cit, pp. 89-90. 
29
 Marshall Wolfe, Approaches to devel-
opment, op. cit., pp. 157-159, maintains that 
within the whole set of small Latin American 
countries a more circumscribed group can be 
defined, characterized by a lower degree of 
urbanization, high rates of population growth, 
less progress along the road of polarized devel-
opment, variable economic growth and, above 
all, dependency upon the lot of one or two 
products in the world market: in toto, less 
capacity to meet conventional development 
requirements. See also Latin American Develop-
ment and the International Economic Situa-
tion, op. cit pp. 13-46. 
or medium spatial dimensions.30 In 
addition, more systematic efforts have 
resulted in the formulation of more 
abstract categories of situations based on 
over two dozen indicators, which 
tend to identify one of these categories 
with the small Latin American nations as 
a group. It includes most of them, 
although some show a tendency to 
diverge from the norm in respect of what 
is today a fluctuating number of indi-
cators.31 
While these observations will duly be 
taken into account for the purposes that 
concern us here, we shall opt for the 
more economical assumption that the 
following considerations are focused 
upon the situation of small nations, 
30
 Helio Jaguaribe singles out the small 
nations of Central America and the Caribbean, 
because of their geopolitical situation and 
because of the greater degree of dependency on 
the United States on the part of their ruling 
élites; Ecuador and Bolivia, on account of their 
insecure viability; Paraguay, because of its 
regime and the severe limitation of its 
resources; Uruguay, which is visibly ap-
proaching the end of its tether as regards the 
maintenance of national development. See "La 
dependencia y autonomía en América Latina", 
in H. Jaguaribe et al., La dependencia politico-
económica de América Latina, Mexico City, 
Siglo XXI, 5th. edition, 1973, p. 52. 
31
 Social change and social development 
policy in Latin America (E/CN.12/826/Rev.l), 
United Nations publication, Sales N°: 
E.70.II.G.3, p. 39, defines a 'type IV1 identi-
fiable grosso modo with some of the small 
Latin American nations. The position of a type 
IV country is 'low' with respect to sixteen 
indicators, 'medium-high' in relation to two and 
'medium' for one. The authors maintain that 
only one or two Latin American countries 
approximate closely to this type but that others 
are in danger of becoming trapped in its 'low-
level stagnation', particularly if their economics 
are highly specialized. The positions and special 
characteristics of Panama, Costa Rica and Uru-
guay are distinguished from those of the rest of 
the group. 
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spatially and demographically definable 
as such (ceilings of 410 000 square kilo-
metres and 6.1 million inhabitants in 
1970),32 situated in the Latin American 
region of the underdeveloped and mar-
ginal world, and exhibiting sharp discon-
tinuities with a generally hostile external 
environment, but also possibilities for 
zonal or regional integration or amalga-
mation movements, whether incipient or 
already under way. 
4. Features of the'small nations' 
It is difficult, and theoretically perhaps 
impossible, to imagine any characteristic 
of a small nation which originates simply 
and solely in the condition of smallness, 
which is not in some way made relative, 
modified or inhibited by some other 
condition or conditions of a different 
sort. Obviously, however, the incidence 
of these latter is again not a question of 
all-or-nothing but of more-or-less, 
whence it may legitimately be deduced 
that there is a whole set of variables 
whose values and conformations make 
them favourable or unfavourable to the 
32
 The first of these ceilings somewhat 
exceeds the area of Paraguay, and the second is 
rather higher than the population of Ecuador in 
1970. Thus they cover the six Central American 
republics, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. A point worth stressing 
is that none of the remaining Latin American 
countries falls below either of these two 
ceilings. In line with the usual practice, we have 
excluded the non-Spanish-speaking communi-
ties of the northern zone of Latin America, and 
also Cuba, because of its special situation. The 
problem of size in the first group has been 
studied by William G. Demas in The Economics 
of Development in Small Countries with Special 
Reference to the Caribbean, Chapter II, 
"Underdevelopment and Self-sustained Growth 
in Small Countries", Montreal, McGill Univer-
sity Press, 1965. 
needs of a small national unit, and whose 
importance will therefore be less depen-
dent on levels, comparative criteria, 
traditional factors or 'special situations'. 
Clearly, 'less' does not imply an absolute 
negation, but it could feasibly be proved 
that in each case such determinants have 
to be very substantial in order to make 
any considerable difference to the plus-
or-minus effects of size. 
The following is a tentative list of 
those which seem to us most important. 
(a) Smallness of size or as an entity 
generally stands for fewer material and 
human resources at the disposal of the 
community, less diversification of these 
resources, and greater concentration of 
those which are really important. If -as 
is usually the case- there are clear com-
parative advantages attaching to the 
production of certain goods and at the 
same time resources are severely limited, 
this line of production will tend to 
absorb all the resources available and will 
leave a narrower margin for any other 
activities;33 all this, of course, at a given 
level of technology, which endues that 
same concept of 'shortage of resources' 
with a historical character, even more 
'historical* than are all the other con-
cepts used in the discussion of the 
question.34 
(b) The shortage of resources and their 
concentration and specialization gene-
rates in turn the narrowness and inelas-
ticity of the domestic market, and makes 
all possibilities of economic growth over-
dependent upon the foreign market, 
which, as Kuznets says, is not a sound 
base for development.35 It is open to 
33Simon Kuznets, op. cit, pp. 15-16. 
Helio Jaguaribe, Desarrollo económico, 
op. cit., pp. 54-56; and Los modelos políticos, 
op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
35Simon Kuznets, op. cit, p. 17; W. 
Demas, op. cit, p. 91. 
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question 'from what point' this narrow-
ness of the market has a really serious 
effect on a small nation's overall pros-
pects and from what point it imposes, 
more specifically, a constraint on feasi-
ble industrial development The thres-
holds usually established for a situation 
in which size has no effect are too high 
for any of the small nations of the Third 
World,36 and the relative advantage of the 
greater unification of a small market37 
will be more than offset by the fact that 
any external investment to produce for it 
will be a less attractive proposition.38 
(c) Although there is not of course an 
optimum scale of magnitude for indus-
trialization,39 it is likewise true that for 
the development of any industry a small 
nation, with its shortage of resources and 
its narrow market, is too far removed 
from the highest point in the scale and 
may even sometimes be incapable of 
attaining the lowest40 In either case it 
has no chance of achieving increases in 
productivity, particularly those deriving 
from economies of scale.41 And low as 
36K.W. Deutsch maintains that market size 
has been shown to have little or no effect on 
economic growth, but this is on the basis of an 
assumed population of 20 million inhabitants. 
Only from that threshold upwards will the 
coefficient of correlation between market size 
and income growth be as low as 0.29. See El 
nacionalismo y sus alternativas, Buenos Aires, 
Editorial Paidos, 1971, p. 116. 
37W.G. Demás, op. cit., p. 91. 
38
 Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit, p. 52. 
39According to Simon Kuznets, op, cit,, 
p. 14, a population of 50 million is too small a 
market for some industries; for others one of 
five million may suffice. 
40
 In Development Problems in Latin 
America: An Analysis by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America, 
op. cit., p, 137, it is pointed out that the 
smaller Latin American nations are lagging 
behind in the import substitution process. 
41
 W.G. Demas, op. cit., p. 9. 
is the viability of industrial development, 
it may sink even farther, to such depths 
as to make industrialization almost 
inconceivable, at least as a development 
device.42 This paves the way for contro-
versy on a subject that will not be 
tackled here for obvious reasons: wheth-
er an industrial system is an indispen-
sable instrument of development, and 
whether specific achievements and some-
times quite spectacular symbols of 
economic independence —such as heavy 
industry and the machine-tools indus-
try— are not liable to involve soaring 
costs, incentives to other branches of 
production which prove still-born, verita-
ble brakes on the capital formation 
process,43 and even obstacles to the 
formation of a fluid capital market, a 
primary essential in a small nation with 
scanty resources.44 
(d) The idea has also been propounded 
that no less onerous than industry on a 
constricted scale are certain services 
which might conceivably be provided by 
economies endowed with greater compa-
rative advantages.45 The argument, 
however, relates —and very weakly at 
that- to the quantum of resources 
available for different uses, since it is 
hard to see what favourable influence on 
development could be exerted by the 
provision of education (no less) entirely 
from abroad -even if there were not 
42
 See Marshall Wolfe, Report on a unified 
approach, op. cit, p. 26. 
43
 Le Than Khoi, "El desarrollo pobre", in 
Opiniáo, N° 130, Rio de Janeiro, 29 April 
1974, p. 10. Some of the arguments put for-
ward by radical economists of the Third World 
are curiously close to those advanced by ortho-
dox economists in central countries. 
44
 HelioJaguaribe, Desarrollo Económico, 
op. cit, pp. 54 et seq.;má W. G. Demas, op. cit, 
p. 91. 
45Simon Kuznets, op. cit., p. 24. 
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traditional and local reasons for rejecting 
such an idea—, or if the same thing 
happened with municipal construction 
(supposing that its small-scale character 
were not a universal phenomenon), or 
even with domestic service (if the costs 
of -da i ly? - transport were not so 
high. . .)• 
(e) The small size of the domestic mar-
ket and the feebleness of the industrial 
development nonnally attainable are in 
their turn responsible for what may well 
be regarded as the maximum disadvan-
tage of limited national size.46 A higher 
degree of dependence on external trade 
flows entails not only the static condi-
tion in. which that results, but also, 
worse still, instability and vulnerability 
to all the price upswings (for imports) 
and downturns (for exports) to which 
international trade is so inexorably sub-
ject. Obviously, with its less diversified 
or more concentrated export trade, a 
small community is bound to be much 
harder hit by price fluctuations and 
possible deteriorations of the terms of 
trade than one where exports and 
imports play only a marginal and 
balancing role.47 
(f) Something that can and must be 
individually mentioned, however much it 
is a corollary of the state of affairs just 
described, is the heavy impact that the 
balance-of-payments problem can make 
on the internal economic circuit. For it 
46
 Svennilson, op. cit., p. 24. 
47
 See Demas, op. cit., pp. 18-23; and 
Deutsch (op. cit, p. 117), who maintains that 
in a country with 10 million inhabitants foreign 
trade represents 35 per cent of the gross nation-
al product, in one with 100 million, 15 per 
cent, and in one with 500 million, 5 per cent. 
Clearly, however, the situation becomes much 
easier when the nation possesses a product in 
great demand (such as gold or oil), but this is 
the exception rather than the rule. 
will necesarily have very direct and 
uncontrollable effects on the internal 
supply of capital, on employment, on 
the monetary stability requisite for a 
sound investment process, and on other 
variables, all of which are highly perti-
nent to any economic development 
policy. 
(g) It is open to question, on the other 
hand, whether smallness of national size 
affects in any specific way the level of 
technological know-how and practice 
which a community may have reached or 
whether its (highly probable) disadvan-
tages in this field derive merely from the 
overall limitation of its resources. It 
seems reasonable, in our opinion, to 
suppose that for small nations there is no 
special time-lag in this respect, and that 
it is general backwardness which holds 
up the inflow of suitable technologies 
and means that output has to be expor-
ted on less advantageous terms.48 
(h) To close this list of directly eco-
nomic variables, one that would seem, in 
contrast, easier to confirm and more 
important is the possibility of flexible 
manoeuvering, of skilful shifting of 
ground, which is within the reach of a 
small nation and derives from its very 
insignificance. Almost certainly, this 
insignificance may likewise have its 
drawbacks: the small nation —in so far as 
it lacks a degree of prestige which on the 
economic plane is not easy to acquire— 
is less capable of taking the initiative in 
amalgamation or integration move-
48
 Svennilson, op. cit., p. 13. 
49
 It may be supposed that under the 
influence of what have been called here associa-
tions and suggestions originating in size, the 
other potential members will perhaps suspect 
that it is the initiator of the movement who will 
gain most. Of course, the experience of LAFTA 
and others of the same kind could have settled 
the question. 
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ments;49 in all probability its voice 
sounds more faintly than others in the 
unheeding or much-importuned ears of 
the international agencies concerned 
with co-operation in development.s0 
But being unimportant has its advantages 
and compensations. Such nations may 
find it easier to adapt to external pres-
sures on a development process that is 
already launched, and may have better 
facilities and a more nimble capacity for 
meshing with the network or fitting into 
the interstices (depending on the image) 
of world trade, recapturing in the fre-
quent upheavals something of what has 
been lost, and possessing aptitudes for 
this which are born of their skill in 
imparting flexibility to their own domes-
tic trade structure.51 
(i) It would seem that these essentially 
economic and commercial gifts of flexi-
bility and adaptability could be made 
extensive to a broader concept of man-
ageability comprising two possible 
currents: one, capacity of mobilization, 
which for the moment we shall leave 
aside; and the other, capacity for con-
trol. To estimate this, it must be 
assumed, one would say, that the flow of 
decisions is characterized by equal and 
average conditions of positiveness and of 
coherence, and that there are no unduly 
formidable physical obstacles and social 
gaps in the way of their implementation: 
in such circumstances, presumably, more 
complete control of space and popula-
tion will be achieved at less cost and 
more thoroughly than in larger ambits. 
As early as in the prenational phase 
Aristóteles noted that too big a city could 
be easily infiltrated by foreigners, which 
s0Marshall Wolfe, Report on a unified ap-
proach, op. cit, p. 8. 
51
 Simon Kuznets, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
weakened the degree of control attain-
able.52 Even without such distinguished 
testimony, it is fairly obvious that the 
same capacity for repression or control 
-as has been strikingly demonstrated in 
a recent Latin American case- becomes 
relatively more effective when it is exer-
ted over a numerically small population 
and within a space that has no very 
marked physical discontinuities. As can 
easily be seen, this possibility, like so 
many others, is a two-edged weapon, 
and, where success is achieved, efficacy 
is no guarantee whatever of the direction 
in which this control will be exercised. 
But, generally speaking, it must be 
pointed out and even emphasized that, 
as Deutsch notes, 'nation-building', in-
cluding regulatory capacity, may perhaps 
have to be 'nation-limiting',53 a lesson in 
humility which is demonstrated pos-
sitively in the older European nations and 
negatively in the Chinese Empire,54 as 
well as in Rome, although somewhat 
more ambiguously there than in the pre-
ceding instances.5S To summarize so 
important a topic, its salient aspect may 
be identified as unequal distribution of 
the scope and effectiveness of the means 
of coercion and persuasion:56 national 
52
 Politics, book VI, chapter IV. 
53
 Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Folz 
(ed.), Nation-Building, Chicago and New York, 
Aldine-Atherton Press, 1963, pp. IX-X. 
Etienne Balazs, in Civilización china y 
burocracia, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sur, 1966, 
p. 29-57, draws attention to the case of an 
undifferentiated sub-continent, little suited to 
the formation of nation-States. 
55
 León Homo, in El Imperio Romano, 
Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1962, p. 238, points out 
the significance of the 'diocese', between the 
'prefecture', which was too large, and the 'pro-
vince', which was too small, as an endeavour to 
represent that living 'regional element' which 
was always lacking in the Roman Empire. 
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size is probably the variable which has 
most to do with this. Furthermore, 
within a very limited space it is more 
likely (although there are examples to 
the contrary, such as that of Nicaragua 
and the rivalry between Leon and Mana-
gua) that tensions between a centre and 
certain local nuclei will be relatively 
weaker than they have usually been in 
more extensive national areas. 
(j) Tocqueville remarked on the all-
seeing eye of small communities.57 Ob-
viously, in view of what has already been 
said, highly effective regulatory or re-
pressive control is achieved, among other 
means, by way of an extremely free 
inflow of information from the society 
to the centre of power, and even a 
reflux from this centre to the society at 
large. This may be of great importance in 
relation to planning practices, although 
it is by no means a guarantee of their 
success. 
(k) A high level of achievement in 
internal control has its reverse side —still 
in the case of developing societies— in 
that same acute vulnerability to the 
incidence of external action which has 
already been noted from the specifically 
economic standpoint. How far this vul-
nerability may be so great as to permit 
of a formal act of domination is a point 
that can be cleared up only by separately 
examining the many planes on which 
s6
 See Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and 
social communication, op. cit, p. 177; and 
Karl W. Deutsch, "Social mobilization and po-
litical development", in Roy C. Macridis and 
Bernard E. Brown, Comparative Politics, 
op. cit., p. 648, where he notes that social 
mobilization is apt to extend the size of States 
beyond their original areas, and that although 
this enlargement is the result of mobilization, it 
also causes mobilization to be counteracted and 
inhibited by sectional concerns as size increases. 
57
 Tocqueville, op. cit. 
dominion can be exercised. While the 
general likelihood of such a thing may be 
asserted on the basis of certain simplifi-
cations, the distinction should be drawn 
that in a world like that of today the 
possibility of annexation through mili-
tary aggression and enforcement is not 
much greater for small nations than for 
those of medium or even large size, 
being, as it is, hedged ,/about by that 
statu quo of respect for the nominal 
forms of sovereignty which is one of the 
conditions of world peace.58 But there 
are other forms of domination that are 
much harder to exorcise and in face of 
which a small nation is more defenceless 
than national units of different dimen-
sions would be. This applies particularly 
to the phenomena of cultural and infor-
mational influences —not to say bombar-
dments—59 and to the very capacity for 
adopting authentically endogenerated 
decisions, that is, decisions in which 
Guridical) 'sovereignty', in terms of real 
power, is equivalent to something more 
than the mere necessity of formal autho-
rization (the requirement that 'it must 
go through something') for options sub-
stantially determined on outside the 
national boundaries. 
There are also conditions which the 
citizens of small Latin American nations 
are in a position to know all too well; 
they occur especially when such nations 
are wedged in between other larger units, 
and that, above all, in strict ecological 
and socio-cultural continuity. In enclaves 
58
 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and social 
communication, op. cit, p. 79, contends that 
although the smaller States are ill-equipped for 
defence an attack against any of them by one 
of the major powers would entail conflict with 
the others, with all the ensuing undesirable and 
unforeseeable consequences. 
59
 See Marshall Wolfe, Report on a unified 
approach, op. cit., p. 7. 
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of this type the small community may 
find its physical and social space daily 
eroded by abusive encroachments which 
will hardly necessitate formal State deci-
sions, and which include a virtually 
irrepressible contraband trade, the in-
fringement of the country's airspace, and 
many other similar practices. 
In addition, this vulnerability to ex-
ternal influences ultimately affects the 
internal capacity for control; but, how-
ever much it does so, the two charac-
teristics in conjunction form a constella-
tion that bodes little good for the 
effectiveness of the development styles 
that a small nation may be in a position 
to choose or maintain. 
(1) James Bryce, a British government 
scientist, on the occasion of a visit to 
Uruguay in 1910 spoke of "nations 
constructed on a small scale".60 But it is 
often their ill-luck that costs exist which 
are inseparable from the very existence 
of a government and a central adminis-
tration (for example, expenditure on the 
foreign service) that have to be met up 
to a certain threshold irrespective of the 
'scale' on which the nation 'is construc-
ted', and that it must therefore cover or 
not be a nation-State. As an old axiom has 
it, large units are very costly and small 
ones just as much so, if the costs are 
compared with the much more limited 
resources out of which they have to be 
defrayed. This is borne out, despite all 
attenuating arguments, by defence 
expenditure;61 in the last few decades, 
however, it seems to have become much 
more evident in the case of scientific and 
technological equipment whose mini-
mum cost is far beyond the possibilities 
60
 See South America: Observations and 
Impressions, New York, MacMillan, 1917, 
p. 351. 
61
 Simon Kuznets, op. cit, p. 26. 
of a small and usually heavily overbur-
dened national budget. 
(m) But the costs of small national size 
are not only economic and material. 
Reference was made at the outset to 
'human resources', although nothing fur-
ther has been said of them. If we are to 
consider them now, we may begin by 
postulating that there is a relationship, 
difficult to establish and still harder to 
quantify, between the volume of a soci-
ety's total resources and the differentia-
tion of roles which this imposes and at 
the same time renders viable; and another 
relationship, more pervasive and generic, 
between the individual destiny and the 
size of the community.62 Tocqueville 
contrasts the great centres where the 
spirit glows, where thought finds greater 
stimulus and ideas circulate more freely, 
where there is more inventiveness and 
less routine, with a whole collection of 
others where in default of all this, there 
is so little room for ambition.63 To put it 
in less imaginative and impressionistic 
fashion, the complexion of many of the 
most valuable intellectual activities and 
vocations is largely dependent on partici-
pation in an intellectual community 
which needs to be increasingly broad: 
that world community of advanced 
knowledge to which a society of rela-
tively considerable magnitude, even if 
not fully developed, can gain access with 
less difficulty than another of limited 
size; or at least, can approach it with 
lower relative costs and with economies 
6
 A Bolivian writer, Rene Zavaleta Merca-
do, says that every man is up to a point the size 
of his country and . . . nationality is an element 
in the ego. . .; the individual ego can attain 
self-fulfilment only through the national ego. 
See Bolivia: Estado nacional o pueblo de 
pastores, La Paz, 1963, p. 30. 
63
 Tocqueville, op. cit. 
Simon Kuznets, op. cit., p. 25. 
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of scale from which a small unit is 
debarred.64 
(n) Nevertheless, it is to be expected that 
even with the high costs referred to, 
given an adequate social level in their 
favour skills are produced which are 
highly appreciated everywhere: factors 
that will be reinforced by the existence 
of natural abilities whose quality does 
not depend on training or where training 
is of little importance in comparison 
with the brilliance of the inborn gift.6S 
Much more commonly still, a great many 
skills may be produced which are not 
outstanding but are above average and 
even distinctly high. Thus in either of 
these cases 'products' are turned out 
"for which there is no societal need, or 
products which the society cannot af-
ford".66 Accordingly, seeing no future 
ahead or restricted in the pursuit of 
vocations which are too specialized for 
the scant differentiation of roles that the 
milieu allows, the most inquiring-minded 
and capable elements in the community 
will be led into mass emigration. It has 
often been pointed out that by this means 
the recipient countries greatly lighten the 
cost of training the skills they need, 
while the expellent country squanders its 
resources. From the standpoint of devel-
opment models and styles, on the other 
hand, the effect of the phenomenon may 
be described as generically ambiguous, 
inasmuch as, if the brain drain enhances 
the security of an authoritarian and 
constrictive project by relieving it of 
65
 A case in point is that of exceptional 
ability in sport, for which there is a world 
market in which the institutions of small 
under-developed nations cannot possibly com-
pete. (After all, sport is a highly important 
economic and social phenomenon.) 
66
 Marshall Wolfe, Report on a unified 
approach, op. cit, p. 31. 
what would certainly be elements of 
dissidence, on the other hand the society 
is deprived of capital in the shape of 
skills which at some time, even if such a 
style prevails, it will probably need and 
will therefore have to seek at much 
higher costs. 
(o) A wide differentiation of roles, how-
ever, is not the only possible means of 
achieving an integration whose outcome 
will be a very strong sense of identity: 
this may also result from links which are 
not forged by complementarity. A more 
than average cohesion or homogeneity 
may be diagnosed as in the nature if not 
as the very essence of smallness of 
national size.67 From Plato to Rousseau 
- i t is worth while to recall- this charac-
teristic was a key element in the prefer-
ence shown for small size in prenational 
communities. The objective implicit in 
all the theses propounded during that 
phase is the existence of common values, 
beliefs and sentiments —even of that 
'intimacy' which was guaranteed by the 
classical 'polis', and the loss of which, it 
has been said, was the supreme political 
problem of the expanded Rome; even, 
indeed of that 'concord' to whose 
striking etymological root attention has 
been called by Bertrand de Jouvenel.68 
These would make feasible, in one way 
or another, the materialization of the 
ideal of self-government and even the 
simple and straightforward forms of 
'direct democracy'. Conversely, assuming 
that excellence in this particular respect 
is one of the requisites for a stable 
political system, it has been argued that 
if a political system cannot be extended 
for an indefinite period of time, the 
67
 W.G. Demas, op. cit, p. 91. 
68
 See Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and 
Vision, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1960, 
p. 72. 
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reason is precisely that it is incapable of 
winning, likewise for an indefinite 
period, solid and wholehearted support; 
therein lies the difference between the 
political system and the economic sys-
tem, since the latter can be indefinitely 
extended because it is based on a pro-
ductivity which theoretically allows of 
unlimited growth,69 In this way cohe-
sion and consensus are linked up with 
the theme of small local and national 
units as 'cradles of liberty', a point 
already touched on in passing; in terms 
of the development problems that are of 
concern here, there seems to be no 
question that in such a political and 
social climate it is easier to secure the 
approval of large sectors of the popula-
tion for any style which needs to rely on 
popular support This applies not only at 
the level of the indispensable changes 
and the shareable objectives, but also, in 
particular, at that of the inevitable sacri-
fices which the project would entail and 
the groups and interests that would have 
to bear the brunt of them. All this would 
likewise involve a considerable dispersion 
and decentralization of planning and 
decision-making mechanisms, which, 
although perhaps their coherence would 
not be strengthened, might find compen-
sation for this loss in terms of the 
support and contributions in which it 
would tend to be reflected. 
The foregoing observations of course 
imply no opinion on the content of the 
stages and achievements that a small 
nation may attain in the adventure of 
development, a subject on which it 
seems too hazardous to generalize out-
side a very precise context.70 But even 
in full awareness of the risk of idealiza-
tion that such a supposition may entail, 
69
 See Hanna Arendt, Imperialism, New 
York, Harcourt Brace, 1968, p. 6. 
it can be assumed that given specific 
climates of cohesion and identification 
extending over very broad social sectors 
(including, of course, the leading politi-
cal and social bloc), in this modernized 
'Gemeinschaft', in this well-integrated 
'team', which the small nation would 
thus become, the innate disadvantages of 
the small unit might be balanced by a 
healthy compensatory pride based on 
the very quality and excellence of such a 
state. What is more, it might find expres-
sion in a capacity for invention and 
social initiative that could be exercised 
—as pointed out by Kuznets, with whom 
we are in agreement here— not only in 
modifying a country's domestic institu-
tions but also in international economic 
relations (as the history of the European 
Common Market itself would appear to 
show).71 For cohesion, concord, a genu-
ine sense of community would not inply 
per se an introversion which, as has been 
remarked, may affect large communities 
more than small ones.72 
(p) With respect to mobilization of the 
population, by which is meant a basically 
spontaneous activation with a minimum 
of compulsion, the course it takes in the 
small national unit may produce effects 
and encounter stumbling-blocks origi-
nating from one and the same cause, in 
other words, it can hardly be denied that 
present-day instances of large-scale popu-
lar mobilization occur in response to a 
powerful ideological stimulus, however 
much that stimulus may be invested and 
integrated with nationalist feelings and 
with traditions of fighting for the com-
70
 See comments on Simon Kuznetá ideas 
respecting the cases of Scandinavia, Switzerland, 
etc. 
71
 Simon Kuznets, op. cit, pp. 28-30. 
72
 Karl W. Deutsch, El Nacionalismo y sus 
alternativas, op. cit, p. 117. 
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mon freedom. What certainly can be 
affirmed is that the incentives behind 
this type of mobilization are not speci-
fically and especially 'patriotic' in the 
traditional acceptance of the term, and 
that it is the ideological spur and amalgam 
that sets such movements afoot and seals 
their style with the formal 'universality' 
of ideologies. This means, among other 
implications, that the promoters of 
mobilization are not usually confined to 
the national cadres and very seldom 
coincide with them. It is readily under-
standable that such a situation may give 
rise to many conflicts of cross-loyalties 
which, at least from the standpoint of 
the kind of mobilization appropriate to 
the development style of a small coun-
try, cannot fail to have some effects that 
are dysfunctional for the nation's inter-
ests. The problem may even become 
crucial in the case of a continent like 
America where the factors of group 
identification spill over State boundaries 
so manifestly and with so much ease.73 
Nor is this all. in' a world virtually 
unified at so many levels, there is appar-
ently still a specific relation between 
spatial ambits and any historical enter-
prise capable of inspiring those involved 
in it with a dynamic sense of participa-
tion in a universal process in which the 
stake are no longer held by only a few 
leading nations. If the major territorial 
units could once call that relationship to 
life,74 it is doubtful whether the same 
thing may ever happen today, but even 
73
 See Marshall Wolfe, El desarrollo esqui-
vo, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1976. The relevant passage appears in English in 
a chapter published as a separate (mimeo-
graphed) text, under the title of "Social and 
political structures; their bearing upon the 
practicability and scope of a unified approach 
to development policy", c F vA L, February 
1972, p. 30. 
more doubtful whether if it should 
happen it would do so in the small 
nations. 
(q) All this poses special problems for 
the establishment of the representative 
formula through which any style must 
express, justify and defend itself. 
Tocqueville maintained that in small 
nations ambition, tempered by weak-
ness, spontaneously opts for motives of 
internal welfare as against those of 
glory.75 But that used to occur in the 
p re-ideological and pre-mobilization 
stage of social development and of the 
still more special manipulation of the 
inferiority complexes which in disadvan-
taged communities usually prevail over 
any form of narcissism. If in addition to 
this fact it is borne in mind that grave 
sacrifices may have to be undertaken 
—and the poorer the levels at which they 
are imposed, the graver they are— in 
order to attain tangible development 
targets, it will be seen to be highly likely 
(and indeed more than likely) that 
preference will be shown for missionary 
and transpersonalist ideologies which 
tend to defer the humanistic objectives 
of common and individual wellbeing in 
favour of rather futile goals of national 
pride and self-preservation. But this is 
not the place to dwell upon the conflicts 
that may arise between the current goals 
and ideologies of what has been called 
the 'sacro-collective' type,76 and others 
more in keeping with the economic 
behaviour pattern that it is desired to 
promote. 
74
 Tocqueville, op. cit, maintains that lust 
for power and love of glory are greater in large 
than in small nations; in the small ones ambi-
tions and desires would seem to be more 
limited. 
75
 Ibid., op. cit. 
76
 David Apter, in The Politics of Modern-
ization, and passim. 
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(r) In the small nations where this type of 
ideology becomes at once more coherent 
and more explosive, it is common for the 
armed forces to influence, in greater or 
lesser degree, the basic decisions of a 
political system. All that need concern 
us here is to underline a constant observ-
able in almost all political processes in 
Latin America, because of the special 
relevance of the way in which in small 
nations the subsystem of coercion will 
react to the prevalence of the ideologies 
referred to: an attempt will be made to 
offset the slightly perfunctory signifi-
cance of the armed forces in a peaceful 
continent by adopting a course which in 
the larger nations of Latin America (for 
example, Brazil or Peru), where the 
armed forces have really fulfilled na-
tional integration functions, may not be 
so necessary. 
5. Small nations and development 
Now that the variables which in the case 
of small national units may affect devel-
opment and its possible styles have been 
singled out, it would be worth while to 
use them in various exercises. 
One of these can be provisionally 
shelved: namely, an endeavour to de-
duce styles and models from the charac-
teristics of the small Latin American 
nations. Its exclusion is due -pending a 
convincing rebuttal— to our belief that 
images, goals, power structures, are the 
really decisive elements in the determina-
tion of styles; and this also means that 
style options are formulated prior to or 
at most correlatively with any considera-
tions relating to context, viability and 
resources, which in any case lend them-
selves readily to adjustment, although 
not to the adoption of decisions. 
A realistic exercise, on the other 
hand, is an attempt to pick out which 
features of a small Latin American 
nation -understood at the highest feasi-
ble and reasonable level of abstraction-
facilitate or hamper, in terms of context 
and resources, any type of development. 
And let us add that if "any type of 
development" is considered, these vari-
ables that infallibly have either favour-
able or unfavourable repercussions will 
not be very numerous; but presumably, 
in any event, however great the diversity 
of styles may be, a very meagre quantum 
of available resources, an extremely 
narrow national market or an acute 
vulnerability to foreign trade. will be 
capable of affecting any development 
that is something more than a mere 
label. 
Finally, another practicable task, 
which will be attempted here in relation 
to a single style, is a review of the 
small-nation characteristics that may 
affect any one of the styles identifiable. 
The first examination we have set 
ourselves to undertake can be brief, 
especially if we refer to the ideas ex-
pressed above in each of the eighteen 
paragrahps (a) to (r). 
All the strictly economic aspects 
covered in paragraphs (a) to (g) (market 
size, resources, vulnerability to foreign 
trade, importance of the balance of 
payments, etc.) appear as unfavourable. 
Unfavourable too is the low level of 
autonomy on which a small nation can 
count for the preservation of the area of 
sovereign decisions and for the most 
advantageous application of the re-
sources resulting from them (k). Under 
the same head may be included the 
higher relative costs deriving from the 
existence of the State machinery, of a 
public administration, of a system of 
national defence (1). Identical in nature 
are the poorer chances of social, cultural 
and vocational diversification and the 
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fact that whatever is achieved in that 
direction indirectly results in a consider-
able brain drain (m) and (n). Lastly, 
mobilization conditions are also adverse 
in respect of the necessary incentives and 
the counter-loyalties which may have 
obstructive effects (p). 
In contrast, as a general rule, the 
greater inconspicuousness and the flexi-
ble adaptability which were pointed out 
as counterbalancing the shortage of 
resources will be beneficial elements (h). 
So also will the easier manageability and 
better internal control of behaviour pat-
terns and application of resources which 
smallness of national size implies (i) and 
(j), as well as its other by no means 
imaginary implication of capacities for 
cohesion, support, fluidity and inven-
tiveness in decision-making, mobilization 
and other lines of conduct. 
Lastly, as we have already demon-
strated, a high degree of ambiguity 
attaches to the function of an assuredly 
inevitable 'national ideology' as well as 
to that of the forces of coercion (q) and 
(r). 
6. The small nation and the 'constrictive' 
style of development 
As a test of what we identified as a 
second feasible task let us see what 
possibilities and obstructions a small 
national framework offers for a 'con-
strictive' style of development.77 
77
 Latin American development styles can 
be divided into four basic types which I have 
termed 'constrictive', 'integrative', 'harmonizing' 
and 'restructuring'. The 'constrictive' style is 
similar to that called by Graciarena 'modern 
elitist'. See Jorge Graciarena, "Types of income 
concentration and political styles in Latin 
America", CEPAL Review, N° 2, second half of 
1976, United Nations publication, Sales N°: 
E.77.II.G.2, pp. 203 etseq. 
It would seem obvious, for a start, 
that an extreme policy of productivity at 
any cost will not survive very long, at 
least in the quantitative terms that are 
usually worth while, if the set-up is one 
of unavoidable shortage and under-
diversification of resources. Such a situa-
tion may make it unrealistic to follow 
similar models adopted in milieus better 
fitted for them; and this lack of realism 
may produce a wide range of effects 
(adjustments, substitutions, a search for 
external or internal scapegoats, and even 
persistent integration efforts). 
Meagre resources and a narrow mar-
ket may also offer little to attract mass 
inflows of foreign private investment, 
which, without substantial incentives, 
might well find the future outlook daun-
ting if the international image of the 
development style were very sombre and 
the existing level of repression very high. 
All this would tend to carry weight, 
unless there were specific possibilities of 
the area's integration with others that 
held out better promises; or again, unless 
certain special situations of upheaval and 
insecurity -which should not be con-
sidered here- were to arise in neigh-
bouring nations, creating circumstances 
which, at least in hard times, are liable to 
transform a small and well-controlled area 
into a haven of no-loss-of-profit, or at 
least of no-consequential-damages, to 
adapt the terms of civil law. Save in 
these two exceptional eventualities, it is 
unlikely that the most generous legisla-
tion on investment of foreign capital will 
accomplish more than an improvement 
of the juridical and financial status of 
foreign enterprises established in the 
country, which will thus obtain unlooked-
for circumstantial profits. Another point 
to add is that if the production effort is 
concentrated, as is highly probable, on 
exports and on the improvement of the 
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balance of payments, the style will be 
rendered highly vulnerable to two such 
uncertain variables as the size of the 
domestic market and the nature of the 
industrialization process. Furthermore, if 
an attempt is made to provide an initial 
stimulus to industrialization of the type 
tried out elsewhere, the idle capacity 
required for immediate activation will 
almost certainly be lacking in the area. 
Emphasis on export activities and on the 
subordinate position of consumption 
may also come to signify a process of 
re-establishment of 'enclaves' capable of 
generating sharp differences between the 
privileged sectors and the rest, with the 
corresponding social repercussions. 
All the foregoing considerations, ex-
cept for the proviso relating to foreign 
capital prospects, assume the small 
nation to exist in a vacuum. Probably, 
however, its aim is rather to operate as a 
'model adscriptive' to another of larger 
size, especially in such fields as the provi-
sion of raw materials and redundant 
manpower and even the acquisition of 
energy, industrial products and more 
appropriate and cheaper technology than 
could be purchased elsewhere. 
The constrictive style, like any other, 
will have to cope with the fact that the 
costs of public administration are pro-
portionally higher for a small nation, but 
in all likelihood in a climate of firm 
repression of demand such outlays 
-except for expenditure on security, 
which could always tend to increase in 
both absolute and relative terms- may, 
with inflation playing its part, be sub-
stantially restricted. 
Above the average, and even maxi-
mum, will be the potential for control 
and inflow of information common to 
small areas, and so will, in particular, the 
capacity for manipulation that an autho-
ritarian system can attain in the external 
strategy of a small community. This is 
true both at the economic level —where 
these possibilities may feasibly be real-
ized- and in the political field. In the 
latter, however, there may conceivably 
be much less room for manoeuvre, at 
any rate during an initial stage and until 
the time has come to move on to more 
pragmatic and less 'committed' points of 
view; which likewise means that during 
that first stage the inflexibility of politi-
cal management may be highly prejudi-
cial to the desired flexibility of eco-
nomic management. 
With regard to the chances of se-
curing able and active support from the 
population and of creatively utilizing the 
latent potential for cohesion and inven-
tiveness which may be primarily charac-
teristic of small units, it may reasonably 
be supposed that the normally compul-
sive nature of the style and the very line 
it takes in social and ideological respects 
are not calculated to win the allegiance 
of those age groups and sectors of 
activity (youth, intelligentsia, techni-
cians) which are more inclined to give 
unstinted backing to an alternative orien-
tation of a more consensual and harmo-
nizing character. However, the style does 
not call for much mobilization, but 
rather the contrary, a fact which tends 
to cancel out the adverse implications of 
the phenomenon; and, moreover, the 
latent dissension represented by external 
and conflictive loyalties (ideological, uni-
versal, continental) can perhaps be re-
pressed at little -or at least little 
immediate— cost. 
Within this general picture of lack of 
mobilization and scant recourse to inno-
vative possibilities, the fact that there is 
less differentiation of roles in small 
countries will also be beneficial to a 
conservative style, especially as long and 
in so far as this low degree of differentia-
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tion is reflected psychosocial^ in a range 
of more modest, conformable and rou-
tine aspirations. For those that do not 
merit these epithets, emigration will be 
an effective expedient that may only 
become dysfunctional when it drains the 
reserves and decimates the cadres of the 
most indispensable technical capacity; 
and also -over the long term- when in 
addition to the cultural devastation that 
repression involves the average intellec-
tual level of the community has irreme-
diably deteriorated. But lucidity, a high 
standard of information and unremitting 
self-determination on the part of the 
citizenry are not among the goals of the 
constrictive style, and the effects alluded 
to generally operate at a leisurely pace; 
the channels of communication are slow 
to report them, and the most alarming 
messages either reach people who are not 
in a position to exert influence or even 
to obtain a hearing or, if they come to 
the hands of those who are, will certain-
ly be decoded in different ways. 
The constrictive style also requires 
less capacity than any of the other 
alternatives for autonomous decision-
making without reference to the powers 
that happen to be in the ascendant in 
the area, which means that external risks 
are greatly mitigated; and in everything 
that does not come under this head, i.e., 
hostility on the part of international 
public opinion, dangers latent in this, 
etc., the course usually tried will be that 
of seeking international associations with 
other States whose attitude is similar. 
Such associations, besides still further 
blackening the external image of the 
system, may be hopelessly symbolical 
and represent very slight material advan-
tages. 
Let us take note of two other proba-
ble traits. In small, peaceful nations, 
where accordingly it may be assumed 
that for many generations the forces of 
coercion have not waged international 
wars or —for obvious reasons of size-
undertaken tasks of physical and social 
integration that others have performed, 
they will tend to lay persistent emphasis 
on their symbolical value as custodians 
of a decidedly rigid social order and of a 
'life style' and a national entity virtually 
inseparable from it. This claim will be 
highly consistent with the 'sacro-
collective' character with which —as we 
said- the inevitable 'national doctrine' 
tends to be invested, and a substantial 
affinity will even be perceptible between 
that doctrine and the sectoral traditions 
and values of the armed forces that so 
strongly influence the formal structure 
of the subsystem of coercion. Neverthe-
less, this ideological bias may come into 
head-on collision with the secular-
libertarian values implicit in a neocapi-
talist economic model, so that the two 
may do each other mutual harm, or, as is 
even more likely, may spoil theirchances 
of being taken very seriously. 
